Introduction
Revenue-sharing rules; the development of the national carbon accounting system; whether oil palm or plantations should be eligible for REDD+ credits; how REDD+ does or doesn't align with other government policies on forests; MRV; the threat corruption poses to REDD+ fast start money; the possibility carbon cowboys could abuse the system to the disadvantage of forest peoples; how REDD+ could compete with palm oil as an investment.
This was the reply from Sunanda Creagh (2010), Reuters' Jakarta correspondent, when asked about the primary discourses shaping REDD+-reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and enhancing forest carbon stocks in developing countries-in Indonesia. As Creagh's answer shows, what began as an apparently straightforward concept of paying forest-rich developing countries to preserve forests has evolved into something of a political minefield. Public policy is not always driven by the search for science-based solutions, nor is it typically the result of an ordered, logical process. Rather, the process of public policy is driven by a decentralised network of actors at multiple levels; embedded among markets, hierarchies, coalitions, networks and states; and influenced by a multitude of interests, strategies and beliefs (Peskett and Brockhaus 2009, p. 26) . REDD+ is no exception.
REDD+ has become a key area of debate in global and national climate change policy processes. Indonesia is the world's third largest emitter of carbon, with more than 80% of the country's emissions coming from land use change-primarily deforestation. This makes Indonesia's REDD+ policies not just nationally but globally significant. To date, climate change policy analysis has focused on global issues, with little attention given to nationallevel debates, particularly those in developing countries. Moreover, national-level analyses have tended to refer to broad policy recommendations about what should be done, rather than taking into account the issues raised in such debates. This paper uses media analysis to investigate how policy debates around REDD+ are represented to the Indonesian public. By examining the content of national media reports since the concept of REDD+ was first proposed in 2005, and adding depth and perspective to these coded data through interviews with journalists who have covered REDD+, the study has captured a snapshot of the actors, frames, processes and policy debates that are driving REDD+ in Indonesia. The study is based on the hypothesis that gaining an understanding of the different frames that actors use to define and influence REDD+ policy debates, and the way in which these debates are portrayed in the media, will help identify policy options to facilitate REDD+ mechanisms that are effective, efficient and equitable.
Media coverage of REDD+ in Indonesia indicates that the issue has captured the attention of a broad crosssection of society. However, opinions are evidently polarised and some voices are clearly louder than others. Moreover, while the engagement of all levels of society has been constructive for moving the policy debate forward, equally it has raised financial expectations and created conflict over resource control. Consequently, the need to balance conflicting and competing interests is likely to have significant implications for creating a REDD+ strategy that is effective, efficient and equitable.
Simply REDD: An introduction to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
Carbon emissions from land use change-primarily tropical deforestation and forest degradationmake up an estimated 15-20% of all global carbon emissions (IPCC 2007) , which is more than the global transport sector. The 'crucial role' of forests in climate change mitigation and the need for the 'immediate establishment' of a REDD+ mechanism were officially endorsed in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Copenhagen Accord, December 2009 (FCCC/CP/2009/L.7). The basic idea is for developed countries to compensate forestrich developing countries in return for preserving their forests. It involves placing a value on forest carbon that will enable forest conservation to compete financially with the traditional drivers of deforestation, which include agricultural conversion, timber extraction and infrastructure development. In addition to carbon sequestration, REDD+ could also deliver significant cobenefits, such as conserving biodiversity, reducing poverty and improving forest governance.
However, although the overarching principle of REDD+ is relatively straightforward, determining how it will work in practice is proving to be far more complex. For example, REDD+ will only work if it is properly designed and implemented; if it is broad enough to secure binding, multilateral support, yet specific enough to apply to diverse national circumstances; if transaction costs are sufficiently low to enable forest conservation to compete with other land use options, yet inclusive enough to secure the support of the local and indigenous communities that are best positioned to exercise stewardship over the forest (Kanninen et al. 2007; Angelsen 2008) .
The evolution of the REDD+ debate has seen a gradual expansion of scope: from RED, or 'avoided deforestation' as it was referred to at the time, during the UNFCCC 11 th Conference of the Parties (COP 11), in Montreal, Canada; to REDD+, incorporating avoided forest degradation, which was endorsed at COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia; to REDD+, including forest conservation, sustainable management of forests and reforestation/afforestation, which was first proposed in early 2009. Some have even proposed REDD++, which takes in carbon sequestration from agricultural activities. While the model endorsed in the Copenhagen Accord is accepted to be REDD+, given the temporal scope of this study, the paper uses the term REDD in the results and methodology sections, unless otherwise taken from a direct quote.
After the possibility of including avoided deforestation in a future global climate agreement was first raised at COP 11 in 2005, formal discussions at the international level initially focused on technical and methodological issues. However, given that many of the main actors that have emerged in the global REDD+ debate are concerned with objectives beyond mitigating climate change, discourse on the subject has since evolved largely into political bargaining (Peskett and Brockhaus 2009, p. 27) .
As Creagh has identified, issues such as land tenure, indigenous rights, funding mechanisms, corruption and emission reference levels are now topics of much debate among government, corporate and community stakeholders. Concerns with REDD+ among developing countries include the possible negative impacts on economic growth and loss of national sovereignty, while developed-country concerns include leakage, permanence, additionality and the economic implications of including REDD+ within mechanisms such as international carbon markets. At the national level, common challenges include: 'ensuring high level government commitment; achieving strong coordination within governments and between state and non-state actors; designing mechanisms to ensure participation and benefit sharing; and establishing monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems' (Peskett and Brockhaus 2009, p. 25) .
Nevertheless, more than 40 countries are moving forward with a range of models for REDD+.
CIFOR's Global Comparative Study of REDD+ and the 3E criteria
Despite the risks and uncertainty associated with REDD+, it is widely acknowledged that the risks and uncertainty associated with inaction on deforestation are far greater (Stern 2006) . The urgency of climate change means there is not sufficient time to perfect REDD+ policy design before implementation. Therefore, CIFOR is carrying out a multi-year, global comparative study of REDD+ across Asia, Africa and Latin America. The study will provide policymakers, practitioners, donors and negotiators with a sciencebased analysis of policy processes, strategies and implementations. The objective is to support informed decision-making that will help deliver REDD+ programmes that are effective, efficient and equitable. These are known as the '3E criteria' .
Effectiveness refers to the amount of emissions reduced or removals increased by REDD+ actions. Are the overall climate targets met? Efficiency refers to the costs of these emissions reductions or removal increases. Are the targets being achieved at minimum cost? Equity refers to the distribution of REDD+ costs and benefits. Are the benefits shared and the costs allocated fairly? (Angelsen 2009, p. 5; original emphasis) The study comprises 3 research components: (1) national REDD+ processes and policies; (2) REDD+ pilot sites; and (3) REDD+ monitoring and reference levels. The first component, in which this paper is included, analyses how national processes to formulate and implement REDD+ policies reflect diverse interests at all levels. It is based on the premise that 3E outcomes of REDD+ national strategies depend on the country's governance structure, its actors, mechanisms, policy processes, institutional context and macroeconomic conditions. It is thus hypothesised that the 3E outcomes of a country's national REDD+ strategy can be enhanced by understanding the relationships between actors, structures, processes and policies, and by designing appropriate options for REDD+ mechanisms that incorporate this understanding.
Indonesia: The story so far
Indonesia has in the range of 86-93 million ha of forest cover (nearly 50% of total land area); only Brazil and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have larger areas of tropical forest. Indonesia's forests are among the most biologically diverse ecosystems on Earth. They provide habitats for 17% of the world's birds, 16% of reptiles and amphibians, 12% of mammals and 10% of plants (World Bank 2007) . Approximately half of the world's tropical peatlands are located in Indonesia, covering about 21 million ha. This equates to around 83% of all the peatlands in South-east Asia (FAO 2006) .
Although accounts vary, deforestation levels in Indonesia are estimated to be around 1.8 million ha per year, or approximately 2% of total forest cover (World Bank 2007) . Between 1990 and 2005, Indonesia lost around 28 million ha of forests, or 24% of total forest cover (FAO 2006) . According to Ministry of Forestry data, illegal logging has accounted for 75% of annual timber consumption in Indonesia (2002) , though this proportion has dropped significantly in recent years. Indonesia's annual carbon dioxide emissions are estimated to be just over 3 billion tonnes, 85% of which come from forestry and land use change (PEACE 2007) . Drivers of deforestation in Indonesia traditionally include agricultural and bioenergy expansion, logging and infrastructure development. According to Buckland (2005) , oil palm plantations are the major cause of fragmentation and loss of forest habitats.
According to Moeliono (2009, p. 178) , almost a decade into Indonesia's extensive forestry decentralisation process, good forest governance remains elusive and the struggle for control of forest resources remains unresolved. While the Ministry of Forestry is experimenting to varying degrees with community forestry programmes and reform of forest tenure, such initiatives have largely focused on use and access to forest resources, not decisionmaking or ownership. Consequently, some forestrich districts have eagerly pursued REDD+, entering into agreements with international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), private brokers and multinational investment banks to join the voluntary carbon market. Others are continuing to convert forestland to other uses for more traditional 'development' purposes.
One of the earliest steps in the Indonesian REDD+ process was the formation of the Indonesian Forest-Climate Alliance (IFCA) in December 2007, immediately prior to COP 13 in Bali. Since then, the central government has engaged with multilateral initiatives driving REDD+ at the global level, such as the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and the UN-REDD programme, and established national institutions, including the National Council for Climate Change (DNPI), under the President's Office, and the REDD+ Committee, under the Ministry of Forestry. Several major regulations have been enacted to ease the way for REDD+ implementation. However, while a number of pilot projects have been recognised, the government has failed to acknowledge numerous projects initiated by local governments, NGOs and the corporate sector (Murdiyarso 2009, p. 32) .
What is a media analysis and what can it tell us?
The cultural politics of climate change are 'dynamic and contested spaces battled out by various actors' (Boykoff 2008, p. 565) , and there is considerable competition among scientists, industry, policymakers and NGOs. Each of them is likely to be actively seeking to establish their particular perspective on the issues as the one to be adopted (Anderson 2009, p. 166) . Mass media are an 'influential and heterogeneous set of non-nation state actors' (Boykoff 2008, p. 550 ) that function as both windows and drivers of informal and formal discourses, which embody the expression of cultural and political identity. On the one hand, media reports reflect existing social perceptions of an issue. On the other hand, media reports will affect social perceptions of an issue. Therefore, by examining how the media portray policy processes and how various actors represent their interests to strengthen political coalitions and affect public opinion, we can identify some of the main challenges in the policy arena. Ever since the media began reporting on climate change in the late 1980s, studies have examined how this coverage has reflected and affected climate change policy. Over time, these analyses have become increasingly sophisticated, applying numerous content, framing and critical discourse analysis tools.
For example, Boykoff has identified how UK tabloids adopt tones of fear, misery and doom in order to foster 'inertial acceptance of status quo inequities rather than motivation to address associated issues of climate change, socio-economic disparity and differential vulnerability ' (2008, p. 563) ; and how US media coverage on climate change has disrupted the institutionalized journalistic norm of 'balanced reporting ' (2007) . Carvalho (2007) has demonstrated how media representations of climate change science are strongly entangled with ideological standpoints. Tynkkynen (2010) has discovered that Russian discourse on climate change is driven by a nationalistic perception of 'Russia as a Great Power' , rather than a political, economic, social or environmental imperative.
Nevertheless, few such studies have been carried out in developing countries, even though they are likely to suffer the worst effects of climate change. And few or no media-based analyses have been carried out specifically on REDD+, despite its significance to the global climate change debate. According to Anderson (2009) , just one published piece of research (from Panos Institute) includes the perspectives of journalists and media professionals in developing countries.
Media framing
Framing is an important part of communication, employed to contextualise and organise the dynamic fusion of issues, events and occurrences. According to Bennet (cited in Boykoff 2008, p. 555) , a media frame is 'a broad organising theme for selecting, emphasising, and linking the elements of a story such as the scenes, the characters, their actions, and The primary frame of a news article is likely to be captured in the headline, subheading and/or the first few paragraphs. In longer articles, later paragraphs may examine the story from a different angle, generally returning to the original theme in the conclusion; in such cases, the news article is said have 2, or possibly more, frames. Identifying primary and secondary frames enables us not only to ascertain the different ways in which journalists and editors might understand a particular issue, but also to assess the comparative importance given to these different understandings.
Methodology
The primary frame is likely to quote a source to 'advocate' the frame and, for the sake of balance, may also include an alternative view to that initially proposed, referred to here as an 'adversary' . Adversaries are generally given less prominence, space and direct voice than the advocate. Again, identifying advocates and adversaries enables us not only to ascertain the principal actors who are shaping the discourses on a particular issue, but also to assess the comparative importance that journalists and editors give to these actors (Di Gregorio 2009, p. 1).
Newspaper and article selection
We selected 3 national newspapers in IndonesiaKompas, Media Indonesia and Republika-which were likely to capture a broad geographic, social and political picture of REDD+ in Indonesia.
Daily circulation of Kompas is approximately 500 000 (up to 600 000 on Sundays), and it is estimated that each copy is read by 5 people. This makes it the most widely read newspaper in Indonesia. It also controls a number of regional syndications. Kompas is distributed nationwide and is printed in Jakarta, Central Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Bali and Nusa Tenggara. It also spans the religious and ethnic spectrum. Kompas is generally regarded as an independent operator, with no specific political affiliation, although journalist Brigitta Isworo described many of her readers as 'policymakers' . The population of newspaper articles for the discourse analysis was compiled through an electronic Boolean query using the keywords 'REDD' , 'reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation' and 'avoided deforestation' . All 3 newspapers are published in Indonesian, so the keywords were translated and indigenised. The search included all news reports, feature stories, editorials and letters to the editor since December 2005, when the concept of REDD was first officially proposed, during COP 11.
The coding process
The coding exercise involved the collection of data at 3 levels.
Level 1 coding captured descriptive variables only, including date and author, the length of the article, what day of the week it ran and the section of the newspaper it appeared in. While largely used for identification purposes, level 1 coding can indicate shifts in the priority placed on REDD coverage in the media. Level 1 coding also captured whether the article included only a passing mention of REDD; in such cases, no more data were collected.
Level 2 coding compiled broad variables about the primary and, where applicable, secondary frames. This included: the manner in which the article framed the REDD debate (e.g. diagnostic, prognostic, symptomatic, motivational); the political scale at which it framed the debate (e.g. international, national, subnational); and the specific topics around which it framed the debate (e.g. political, economic, ecological).
Level 3 coding identified the primary and secondary frames in much more detail. It included identification of the main advocates and adversaries of the frame, their particular ideological positions and their assessments of future REDD outcomes. It allows a more detailed identification of the REDD-related discourses in Indonesia and the different coalitions advocating particular approaches to REDD.
Level 3 coding also included an inventory of protest events, policy events and core actors. For the purposes of the coding, protest events were defined as 'a collective, public action regarding issues in which explicit concerns about the environment [in our case REDD] are expressed as a central dimension, organised by non-state instigators with the explicit purpose of critique or dissent together with societal and/or political demands' (Fillieule and Jimenez 2006, p. 273) . Policy events were defined as 'a critical, temporally located decision point in a collective decision-making sequence that must occur in order for a policy option to be finally selected' (Laumann and Knoke 1987, p. 251) . Core actors were defined as 'an organization and/or individual that defines it/him/ herself and that is perceived by others as being part of the national REDD policy domain' (Laumann and Knoke 1987, p. 251) .
Lembaga Studi Pers dan Pembangunan (LSPP), the Institute for Press and Development Studies, a Jakarta-based NGO, carried out the coding exercise.
Articles were coded in Indonesian, and string variables translated into English.
Before commencing the coding, a training workshop was conducted with the 2 coders from LSPP, during which the methodology was discussed in detail and several sample articles coded. Any divergent results were examined as a group, to ensure common understanding about potentially ambiguous variables. During the coding process, an inter-coder reliability test was conducted, which involved the scoring of 20 random samples to determine the level of consistency. Accounting for spuriousness, this produced an intercoder reliability rate of 85%.
Expert interviews
To complement the coding process, short interviews were conducted with selected journalists who have covered REDD in Indonesia. Interviewees included the most frequently featured journalist from each of the 3 coded newspapers; a journalist from The Jakarta Post, Indonesia's most widely read English-language newspaper; a foreign correspondent from Reuters; the founder of the Society for Indonesian Environmental Journalists (SIEJ); the producer of Metro TV's Green News; and a producer of Asia Calling, a radio current affairs programme broadcast to 10 countries across the region.
The questions were designed to add depth and perspective to the coded data, to elicit the journalists' personal insights on the evolution of REDD in Indonesia and to validate and explain any specific trends. Questions covered a range of issues around media coverage of REDD in Indonesia, including connections to climate policy and climate research. They were grouped into 3 subsets of questions: actors, topics and policy positions; the chronology of key policy events; and sources of information.
Levels 1 and 2: Trawling through the foliage
The study involved 3 levels of coding analysis. became less significant within Indonesia's climate change debate, or that it became more difficult for the media to cover REDD.
The first Indonesian mention of REDD appeared in Kompas in April 2007, in a story titled ' Australia to help solve deforestation in Indonesia' . Australia's Environment Minister at the time, Malcolm Turnbull, was quoted as saying: 'Indonesia's forests are the world's lungs and are, therefore, in the interests of the international community, not just an Indonesian issue. '
As Figure 2 illustrates, half of all REDD coverage appeared during the October-December quarter of 2007 (94 articles), which coincided with COP 13 in Bali. A further 18% (34) appeared during the October-December quarter of 2009, which coincided with COP 15 in Copenhagen (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) . Therefore, more than twice as much coverage occurred during these 6 months than during the other 27 months since REDD was first mentioned-or 43 months if we count back to COP 11 in Montreal. Even though the UNFCCC hosted a Conference of the Parties in 2008 (COP 14, in Poznań, Poland), it received much less media attention than did Bali and Copenhagen.
While Kompas accounted for half of the total, coverage before and during COP 13 in Bali was more evenly spread across the 3 newspapers. In fact, during this period Media Indonesia actually ran more articles on REDD (37) than Kompas (33). This is in sharp contrast to the spread of coverage before and during COP 15 in Copenhagen, during which time Kompas (26 articles) ran more than 3 times as many articles on the topic as Media Indonesia (7) and Republika (1) combined.
REDD events: From global to national and back again
Several significant international and domestic policy events, which the media have covered, have influenced the evolution of REDD in Indonesia ( Figure 3 ). These events include the annual UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, the launch of the National Climate Change Council (DNPI), the formation of a bilateral co-operation agreement between Indonesia and Australia and a number of regulations relating directly or indirectly to REDD policy. COP 14) . ' However, not only does the quantity of media coverage dip significantly in 2008, but also the coverage shifts in focus from primarily international policy events to domestic events. Throughout the 3-year period, the majority of media frames were located at the international level (53%), with just over a third at the national level (38%). However, as Figure 4 illustrates, a sizeable shift from an international (27%) to a national-level focus (67%) occurred in 2008. This correlates with the key policy events identified in Figure 3 , which features the launch of major REDD pilot projects, the establishment of the DNPI and a number of national government regulations.
Despite the change in scale in the focus of reporting, there is a level of consistency in the discourse, which continues to revolve around such issues as land rights, funding mechanisms, carbon accounting and opportunity costs. Where the discourse does shift between scales, it is in the understanding, or context, of these broad issues. For example, at both international and national levels, there is a recurring discourse on the distribution of REDD costs and benefits, revolving around the concern that the opportunity costs of implementing REDD will be borne by one group of actors, while the benefits of REDD will be appropriated by a more powerful group.
At the international level, the concern is that developing countries such as Indonesia will be forced to curtail their economic growth through initiatives such as REDD, in order to pay for the sins of developed country polluters, committed on their path to prosperity. At the national and sub-national level, the concern is that local and indigenous communities will bear the costs of REDD, whereas capitalist elites and opportunistic carbon brokers will enjoy the benefits. For example, Hadi S. Pasaribu, from the Ministry of Forestry, frames the argument around the responsibility of industrialised countries to provide sufficient incentives for Indonesia to preserve its tropical forests: 'There must be compensation for this, as Indonesia's forests help the world to absorb carbon emissions' ('Developed countries reject REDD funding ' , Republika, 11 December 2007 
REDD frames: The technical becomes political
Of the population of 190 articles, more than threequarters (77%) of news articles featured only one frame, meaning they rarely examined REDD from more than one angle. We therefore examine a total of 233 frames, most of which were viewed through a political lens.
Of the frames, 59% focused on politics and policymaking, about half of these specifically on international organisations and political debates (see Annex 1 for a complete list of topics and metatopics). Ecological issues (including deforestation) and economics and markets (primarily related to issues of funding) each comprised a further 15% of frames. Governance, civil society, science and culture were rarely a major focus. These statistics remained roughly consistent across all 3 years of coverage on REDD.
Brigitta Isworo explained that Kompas starts from the interests of its readers when making editorial decisions, relying on science only as background to a story: Who are they? What do they need? ... We tell people about government policy towards REDD, as these policies will affect their lives. Therefore, we will criticise these policies if we need to. The focus on politics and policymaking also reflects the way that, in addition to contributing more 'rationality' to politics, science has been exploited for political aims. This is due in part to the scientific uncertainties surrounding environmental issues and the extent to which these uncertainties enable political actors to selectively apply scientific expertise to further their political interests. A good example is the documented links between climate sceptic think tanks, carbon-based industry and climate policy in the United States (Boykoff 2007 , Carvalho 2007 ).
Thus, depending on the individual's ability to decipher and distil the 'scientific' information received, the way in which a journalist covers a particular problem might be as much a reflection of a particular advocate's subjective, politically motivated, approach to this problem, as the journalist's own objective, balanced approach.
As Figure 6 illustrates, more than half of all media frames took a prognostic approach (56%), meaning they articulated a proposed solution to an issue or problem, rather than merely describing the problem. In many cases, the issue or problem is carbon emissions from deforestation or forest degradation, though it may also refer to a technical or political issue related to the design or implementation of REDD. Johar Arif, a journalist for Republika, describes his prognostic approach to covering REDD: We try to educate society that forests have an important role in fighting global warming. That maintaining forests can generate money, so we try to change society's views from cutting down trees to make money, to maintaining forests to make money.
Interestingly, here Arif conflates 2 very different arguments for why REDD should be adopted-the role of forests in addressing climate change and the financial incentive to conserve forests. We examine these arguments in greater detail when we look at the various perspectives of actor groups, captured in level 3 coding.
Twenty per cent of frames were symptomatic, establishing why an issue is a problem, while just 10% were diagnostic, defining a problem and identifying who or what is to blame for the problem. A further 12% were motivational, in which case the frame goes beyond the basic existence of an issue and its causes or consequences, and puts forward moral or motivational reasons to take action or otherwise. This statistical breakdown remained roughly consistent across secondary frames.
Across time, the prognostic approach again remained dominant. However, as Figure 6 actions and holding policymakers to account' (Shanahan 2009, p. 156) , and that an effective, efficient and equitable REDD scheme is predicated on all stakeholders, including the least powerful, being sufficiently represented within REDD policy discourse. Failure by the media to distil the subjective, often complex, and politically driven information they receive, in order to deliver objective, rational and factual commentary on the issues, is likely to afford undue advantage for certain prominent actors to inform and influence public opinion. 
Level 3: Digging deeper

REDD actors: A variety of voices, some louder than others
Nearly all frames (98%) feature a specific actor that advocates a particular ideological, personal or political stance in relation to that frame. In most cases, this actor is quoted. (The term 'advocate' does not mean this person is necessarily for or against REDD, but simply that they advocate a particular stance in relation to that media frame.) On the other hand, just 13% of frames feature an adversary to contest or debunk this stance. This appears to support Surjadi's claim that reporters in Indonesia 'publish opinions without debate or challenge' .
The entire population of 190 articles features a total of 220 advocates and 31 adversaries. As Figure 7 indicates, national-level state actors are the most frequently cited (44%, or 111 frames in total). These national bureaucrats include representatives from the Indonesian Ministries of Forestry (32 frames; see Figure 8 ) and Environment (15) 
REDD perspectives: To keep the forest and clear it too
The stance taken by the advocate of a frame can illustrate how a frame can highlight some aspects, while relegating other aspects to the background. In the case of reporting in Indonesia, more often than not the stance tends to be optimistic about the future success of REDD. However, this general optimism is not matched by a similar consensus on how REDD will work, especially in relation to land use and forest conversion.
Overall, between 2007 and 2009, 60% of advocates and adversaries offered an optimistic assessment of the future of REDD in Indonesia. Fourteen per cent were pessimistic, 6% neutral and 21% offered no judgement. This statistical breakdown is roughly consistent across years (see Figure 9 ), although there is a greater proportion of neutral assessments during 2008 and 2009, perhaps indicating that the REDD arena became more diverse, the issues more layered and opinions less fixed.
However, despite the increase in the number of neutral assessments of REDD and the predominantly optimistic general consensus, REDD consistently provoked strong opinions both for and against. For example, just before COP 13 in Bali, Media Indonesia ran 2 stories about REDD on the same day (12 November 2007). Both stories focused on the significant financial gains that REDD could deliver; however, the primary frame advocates' assessments of the potential implications of such gains are strikingly divergent. In one story ('Private concepts seek shape for REDD'), Neil Franklin, from Asia Pacific Resources International Limited (APRIL)-one of the world's largest pulp and paper companies-forecasts economic incentives of US$90 million from REDD, and 'feels it is time for industrial sectors to improve their commitment and capacity to encourage those kinds of incentives to move along quickly' . In the second story, Mimin Dwi Hartono, an observer active in the environment and human rights, also anticipates enormous economic incentives from REDD, in his case as much as US$2 billion ('Trading in community livelihoods'). However, he goes on to describe REDD as 'a lighthouse project that the political elite and scientists in Jakarta can attain and enjoy by paying little attention to the interests of communities living in and around forests. ' That both these stories were published in the same newspaper suggests Media Indonesia is not driven by a particular ideology or policy agenda, at least in relation to REDD.
Adianto, from The Jakarta Post, sees 4 major groups shaping the REDD arena in Indonesia, each with reasonably consistent assessments:
The government says there is a new mechanism to protect the forest, to combat climate change and benefit local people ... of the NGOs there are 2 types. There are conservationists like TNC who want to protect the forest through carbon projects. Others like Walhi or Greenpeace believe that this is a business that won't protect the forest. The carbon traders, of course, are talking about business.
In line with Adianto's views, and supported by Figure  10, However, Adianto's perception of carbon traders as one of the 4 major stakeholder groups driving REDD discourse in Indonesia is not clearly reflected in the data. National private business interests, business associations and multinational corporations each comprise just 2% of advocates and adversaries (see Figure 10 ).
Rebecca Henschke, from Asia Calling, also perceives a clustering of stakeholders with reasonably consistent assessments of, or policy positions on, REDD. Her picture of the REDD landscape is subtly different to that of Adianto, singling out pro-REDD provincial governments, research institutions and indigenous groups:
The government, especially Papua and Aceh, have been very strong, particularly around Bali, saying: 'We're going to save the forests and you have to pay us to do it'; CIFOR and NGOs have been taking the stance: 'Okay … given that there's been questionable defence of the forest in the past, how is it going to be protected now?'; business groups are looking at it from the economic angle; and indigenous groups, who are told they are going to benefit, are rather bewildered about how they will be players in this.
Evidently, REDD has captured the attention of a broad cross-section of society in Indonesia. However, opinions are evidently polarised and some voices are louder than others. Moreover, charting particular assessments of REDD against particular actor groups shows that not only is there significant variance between, and even within, groups, there are also some notable shifts over time.
For example, all non-environmental domestic NGOs featured as primary frame advocates in 2007 expressed an optimistic assessment of REDD, while the views reported in 2009 were either pessimistic or neutral. Conversely, non-environmental international NGOs featured in 2007 expressed a pessimistic assessment of REDD, while in 2009 they offered either an optimistic viewpoint or no judgement at all. Given that domestic and international NGOs make up a combined total of just 4% of advocates and adversaries, the relatively small number of REDD assessments captured in this coding process would preclude any presumption that these viewpoints are representative of the entire NGO community. This oscillation may be as much an indicator of a shift in reporting on the part of the media as a shift in thinking on the part of the NGO community. In any case, however, it underlines the extent to which the NGO community represents a broad range of stances on REDD.
Discourse on REDD in Indonesia clearly involves a diverse range of actors with differing opinions on REDD, yet there is no doubt the major drivers of this discourse, at least in the extent to which it is played out in the media, are national-level state actors. On one level, based on the data presented in Figure 10 , national-level state actors were overwhelmingly optimistic in their future assessments of REDD (80%), as were their subnational and local-level counterparts (78%). However, an examination of the specific stances that these bureaucratic actors take reveals that perspectives on REDD are not clear cut. Although bureaucratic voices might remain essentially optimistic about REDD, there is little harmony about how the mechanism will actually work.
The Ministry of Forestry (featured 32 times as an advocate or adversary; see Figure 8 ) and the Ministry of Environment (15) are clearly the dominant players in Indonesian discourse on REDD, compared with other ministries featured as advocates or adversaries: Foreign Affairs (5), Marine Affairs and Fisheries (2), Agriculture (1) and Energy (1) . The absence of voices from the agricultural and finance sectors is quite striking, considering that for REDD to be successful 'any rules must be capable of synchronising all policies relating to REDD application, which will be connected to spatial planning, finance and regional autonomy' ('Carbon trading must involve local potential' , Kompas, 18 July 2008). I n d i g e n o u s o r g a n i s a t i o n s I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i s a t i o n a n d b o d i e s I n t e r n a t i o n a l N G O I n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s e a r c h c e n t r e / t h i n k t a n k / e d u c a t i o n a l . . .
M u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n
N a t i o n a l -l e v e l s t a t e a n d b u r e a u c r a t i c a c t o r s N a t i o n a l p r i v a t e b u s i n e s s N a t i o n a l r e s e a r c h c e n t r e / t h i n k t a n k / e d u c a t i o n a l . . . According to Ariseno Ridhwan, a producer at Metro TV, 'there are conflicting interests in government. There's DNPI, the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Agriculture, the Development Planning Agency, the Ministry for Welfare. All have different interests and different angles on how to tackle REDD. ' Media coverage on REDD would suggest that these conflicting interests revolve primarily around land use, specifically a paradoxical unwillingness to inhibit economic development fuelled by forest conversion for agriculture, while rapidly advancing with plans to capitalise on the promised gains from forest conservation through REDD.
For example, on the one hand, some parties see peatland conservation as the key to Indonesia reducing carbon emissions. CIFOR's Daniel Murdiyarso estimated that the carbon stock in peatland was up to 10 times greater than that in terrestrial vegetation and suggested that this should be 'the mainstay of Indonesia's negotiations in fighting for global incentives through REDD' ('Peat mainstay-3 kilometre sterile area around conference site' , Kompas, 22 November 2007). On the other hand, Irsal Las, from the Ministry of Agriculture's Agency for Research and Development, speaking in response to criticism over the use of peatland for agriculture, encouraged Indonesia to anticipate that criticism so it can continue to develop economically: 'Don't let that criticism damage our agricultural development' ('Peat still processed-Indonesia not in top three most vulnerable nations' , Kompas, 9 December 2009).
These conflicting land use interests are not only cross-sectoral, but also intra-sectoral. Although an enthusiastic advocate of REDD, especially during COP 13 in Bali, former Indonesian Minister of Forestry M.S. Kaban was reluctant to compromise the strong economic growth within the sector, which has been driven largely by forest conversion for pulp and paper over the long term, and oil palm in recent years (Buckland 2005) . In a Kompas story just a month before COP 13, he was quoted as saying: 'REDD must not be counterproductive to utilising industrial plantation forests as revenue sources' ('Indonesia proposes REDDDeforestation prevention feared counterproductive' , 6 November 2007).
Brigitta Isworo, from Kompas, highlights these apparent contradictions:
With REDD being pushed, several government regulations and ministerial regulations appeared, the form and level of which was not in line with REDD. As an example, non-tax state revenue which allows all levels of land use change. This is strange in our opinion, because if we are pushing for REDD, why are we issuing policies like that?
The specific regulation to which she is referring is No. Thus, although the dominant voice on REDD in Indonesia is overwhelmingly optimistic, there appears to be no consolidated or coordinated approach to land use management, which takes into account the multiple demands on forests for fuel, food, fodder and now carbon. These conflicting demands will inevitably require compromise, and are likely to have significant implications for creating a REDD strategy that is effective, efficient and equitable.
REDD and the 3Es: Benefit sharing, resource control and power
As explained in Section 1, this study is part of a broader analysis of REDD, the goal of which is to generate knowledge and practical tools that will help deliver REDD projects that are climate-effective and cost-efficient and that provide equitable distribution of costs and benefits.
The stance of each advocate and adversary was evaluated according to whether it placed a priority on any of the '3Es'-effectiveness, efficiency and equity-or alternatively, on what are commonly termed 'cobenefits' (including biodiversity conservation, poverty alleviation and improved forest governance). Actors concerned with effectiveness would be likely to focus on issues such as scope, additionality, leakage, permanence and liability, as well as the need to address underlying drivers of deforestation and degradation. Efficiency concerns would include start-up costs (including capacity building), running costs of financial and carbon monitoring systems, opportunity costs and implementation costs. Those concerned with equity may look at issues to do with different scales and groups of stakeholders based on income, assets, ethnicity, gender and power (Angelsen 2009, p. 5) .
The data indicate that half of all advocates and adversaries (49%, or 124 frames) were chiefly concerned with the effectiveness of REDD in reducing carbon emissions, as opposed to ensuring that a REDD scheme is equitable (28%) or cost efficient (13%); this statistical breakdown remained roughly consistent across time (see Figure 11 ). However, if we look at adversaries only, the priority outlooks were a little more evenly spread-41% were chiefly concerned with effectiveness, 30% with equity and 22% with efficiency. This could indicate that equity and efficiency were more often cited to counter the arguments of advocates who use the climate effectiveness imperative to argue for (or against) REDD.
Clara Rondonuwu, from Media Indonesia, agreed that the media put more emphasis on climate effectiveness, making the point that Indonesia's 'forests are considered the world's lungs' . She described people's financial concerns as revolving around how much money is involved and when it will be received, as opposed to cost efficiency. Regarding equity, Randonuwu claimed that 'only certain readers will respond to the issue of equality in developing countries. Indonesian readers do not respond well to stories like this, only particular groups do: activists or researchers.'
As indicated in Figure 12 , which charts priority outlooks on REDD against particular actor groups, national-level bureaucrats (52%), intergovernmental organisations (58%) and domestic NGOs (57%) were concerned primarily with REDD effectiveness. For example, Rachmat Witoelar, the president of COP 13, was eager to remind people of the purpose of the conference: ' All the discussions are still in line with the initial objective of overcoming climate change' ('Irregularity accusations contested- Subnational bureaucrats, domestic businesses and international NGOs, however, expressed concern primarily with issues of equity (50%, 100% and 57% respectively). For example, Teras Narang, Governor of Central Kalimantan, who has involved the province in several REDD pilot programmes, stressed that his priority in doing so was to benefit local communities: 'We're ready to take part in the scheme as long as its implementation helps empower local forest-dwelling communities' ('Central Kalimantan ready for REDD pilot schemes ' , Republika, 13 December 2007) .
This notion of equity has emerged as a prominent discourse at all levels, as the debate on REDD has moved from a technical to a political sphere. However, although equity was the focus for a quarter of all primary frames (Figure 11 ) and the priority outlook for half of all subnational state actors, it was a priority for only 14% of national-level bureaucrats. The finding that national-level state actors were the most significant drivers of media-based discourse on REDD in Indonesia, making up 44% of all advocates and adversaries, compared with 7% for their subnational counterparts, suggests that the discourse on equity is still marginalised in national REDD policy debates. Nevertheless, looking at discussions surrounding REDD benefit sharing can provide an interesting insight into how different actors understand-or apply-the notion of equity.
We've already seen how the discourse on REDD costs and benefits shifts in application as it shifts in scale. That is, equity concerns at the international I n d i g e n o u s o r g a n i s a t i o n s I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i s a t i o n a n d b o d i e s I n t e r n a t i o n a l N G O I n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s e a r c h c e n t r e / t h i n k t a n k / e d u c a t i o n a l . . .
M u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n
N a t i o n a l -l e v e l s t a t e a n d b u r e a u c r a t i c a c t o r s N a t i o n a l p r i v a t e b u s i n e s s N a t i o n a l r e s e a r c h c e n t r e / t h i n k t a n k / e d u c a t o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n For Kaban, as long as there is no commitment from developed countries to adopt REDD, global efforts to resolve climate change will remain unfair. 'If there are no ties for developed countries, developing countries will have no certainty, because the prop for developing countries is resources, ' he said. Equity concerns at the subnational level apply this same fear of exploitation to local and indigenous communities, who risk losing their traditional forest access and user rights:
REDD negotiations need to be balanced with voices from the grass roots so any mechanism is not just another developed country initiative. Developed countries must accommodate the voices of traditional peoples as the most legitimate owners of the forests (James Mayers, IIED, 'Involve people in REDD negotiations' , Kompas, 2 December 2009).
Isworo, from Kompas, attributes this perspective primarily to local and international NGOs: 'they see local communities will be left behind and suffer most when the concept is running. ' Although this notion of equity and benefit sharing is evident within the political discourse played out at the national-international level, and at the local level in relation to forest user rights, it is also tied up in the discourse between central and provincial governments, specifically in relation to resource control. Moeliono (2009, p. 178) claims that Indonesia's national government is trying to regain control of the forestry sector, and unsubtle hints of such intentions appear in the comments of some national-level state actors in relation to REDD. For example, during COP 13 in Bali, Kaban was quoted in Kompas as saying: 'The vast archipelagic nature of this country of ours is a weakness in REDD implementation, so whether we want to or not, the government must control it' ('Government organises REDD' , 7 December 2007).
With such high economic value being placed on forest carbon, it is not surprising that the issues of regional autonomy and resource control are often at the centre of Indonesian REDD policy debates. Media coverage during COP 13 was marked by frequent announcements from central and provincial governments about REDD pilot projects, REDD regulations, REDD workshops and other actions, as if the governments were vying with each other to establish themselves in what was a tantalising initiative for anyone with authority over forested land.
On 6 December 2007, Barnabas Suebu, Governor of Papua, announced that he would dedicate half of the region's production forests to REDD, awarding forest management rights to small or medium enterprises, as opposed to large conglomerates: 'Ownership of Papua's forests will be returned to the people ... That way felling volumes will be much lower. So, two values will be attained: poverty alleviation and forest preservation' ('Half of Papua production forests for REDD' , Republika). A week later, Irwandi Yusuf, Governor of Aceh, announced a moratorium on logging in the region: 'There will be a lot of unemployment with this moratorium, but I also have to think about incomes for communities that depend on forest products for their livelihoods' ('Moratorium halts logging ' , Media Indonesia, 13 December 2007) . Interestingly, neither governor referred to the financial gains to be made from forest carbon, instead framing the policy reforms in terms of equity-of returning ownership to local people. Clara Rondonuwu, from Media Indonesia, offers a candid appraisal of the expectations that were built up among regional authorities before and during COP 13, driven in part by what she describes as 'bombastic' and 'exaggerated' media coverage on REDD:
Many district heads thought that by releasing their land to foreigners … they would get money. Only now, several years after Bali, do they realise that they can no longer enter certain areas of land any more, and they get no money whatsoever. We'll just have to wait and see what happens later at the peak of this misunderstanding of the REDD concept. Though it hasn't happened yet, district heads and governors angry at the lack of money from REDD will show their reactions.
Central authorities went on to warn their regional colleagues to avoid such scenarios, with the undertones suggesting an inability on the part of regional governments to control forest resources. For example, Agus Purnomo, DNPI Executive Secretary, pointed out that 'one way to guard forests in outlying regions … is for regional governments not to accept any old MoU with anyone' ('REDD not wages for maintaining forest-misunderstanding still rife in regions' , Kompas, 26 August 2009). Wandojo Siswanto, from the Ministry of Forestry, cautioned regions to be wary of the large number of carbon trading brokers, suggesting that regions 'not make forest management agreements with other parties too readily, let alone give up their authority over forest management' (' Aceh ready to calculate Ulu Masen forest carbon stock' , Kompas, 9 November 2009).
Nevertheless, in the lead-up to COP 15 in Copenhagen, the Governor of Central Kalimantan, Teras Narang, remained a prominent advocate for REDD. However, he criticised Indonesia's REDD authority and regulatory policy as 'still centralistic in nature' ('REDD's un-centralistic legal umbrella' , Kompas, 1 July 2009), and called for greater participation by regional governments, who have a better understanding of 'the potential and conditions in their regions' ('Carbon trading must involve regions' , Media Indonesia, 11 November 2009).
However, not all regions have embraced the notion of REDD, instead preferring to pursue more traditional-and secure-avenues towards economic development and poverty alleviation, based on land conversion for agriculture. Republika's Johar Arif recounted the concerns of one provincial governor from Kalimantan:
[He] thought that it would be better to utilise the forest potential in his province for the welfare of the people, since there are still so many poor people there, than to protect the forest ... Meanwhile, the central government's desire to realise REDD in Indonesia was very strong, including working with outside parties. So, what I caught was that there is no agreement between central and regional policies.
Therefore, just as there is a range of perspectives on REDD across sectors at the national level, so too is there a range of perspectives across governments at the regional level, as well as between the different levels of government. Most national-level state actors are focused on ensuring that REDD actually reduces carbon emissions, suggesting that to do so might entail re-appropriating control over forest resources. However, those at the regional level are more concerned with ensuring that REDD is equitable, and that their autonomy over forest resources is upheld. In any case, the discourse on REDD effectiveness, efficiency and equity again demonstrates the extent to which technical issues have been subsumed by politics.
Reducing emissions from deforestation, forest degradation, and enhancing forest carbon stocks in developing countries (REDD+) has become a key area of debate in both global and national climate change policy processes. Indonesia is the world's third largest emitter of carbon, with more than 80% of the country's emissions coming from land use changeprimarily deforestation. This makes Indonesia's REDD+ policies not just nationally but also globally significant. Climate change policy analysis to date has focused on global issues, with little attention given to national-level debates, particularly those in developing countries. Moreover, any nationallevel analysis has generally referred to broad policy recommendations about what should be done, rather than taking into account the specific issues raised in such debates.
By examining the content of national media reports since the concept of REDD+ was first proposed, and adding depth and perspective to these coded data through interviews with journalists who have covered REDD+, this study has captured a snapshot of the events, frames, actors and perspectives that are driving REDD+ at the national level in Indonesia.
Because the stakes are so high, and the interestsboth for and against-so strong, REDD+ discourse is essentially political. This discourse revolves primarily around land use, pitting REDD+ conservation against economic growth fuelled by land conversion. Therefore, REDD+-related decisions are associated with high political risks; to mitigate these risks, decision-makers will have to find compromises.
Several distinct groups are driving the REDD+ debate in Indonesia. At the national level, certain ministries-namely Forestry and Environment-are very much in favour of the mechanism, but although they dominate the REDD+ media discourse, their land use objectives are at odds with those of other ministries, including Agriculture. They are therefore unlikely to achieve their goals without compromise. Similarly, at the subnational level, some provinces-including Central Kalimantan, Aceh and Papua-have embraced the potential for REDD+ to provide incomes and protect the environment, while others are wary of the uncertainties, instead preferring to rely on agricultural conversion for economic growth. NGOs tend to focus primarily on the notion of equity; some such organisations are pro-REDD+-provided it is designed and implemented in a way that respects the rights of local and indigenous communities-whereas others see REDD+ simply as 'mining with a new face' (Isworo, Kompas). Furthermore, while there is some potential for political alliances between these groups-for example, pro-REDD+ state actors at the national and provincial levels-these alliances are unlikely to be solid or long-lasting because of tensions related to regional autonomy and a desire for control over forest resources.
Making REDD+ discourse even more difficult to navigate is the claim that some journalists covering REDD+ simply 'accept information without understanding it … and publish opinions without debate or challenge' (Harry Surjadi, SIEJ). This suggests the discourse will continue to be politically driven, enabling powerful actors to disproportionately inform and influence public opinion.
Nevertheless, this analysis of media coverage on REDD+ in Indonesia indicates that the issue has managed to capture the attentions of a broad crosssection of society. However, opinions are evidently polarised and some voices are clearly louder than others. Furthermore, while the engagement of all levels of society has been constructive for moving the policy debate forward, equally it has raised expectations and created conflict over resource control. If REDD+ in Indonesia is to be effective, efficient and equitable, it will most likely require difficult compromises, the slowing down of policy processes and the creation of innovative ways to balance conflicting interests (Peskett and Brockhaus 2009 ).
Overall, the primary stakeholders appear more concerned with their internal constituency than with external ones, which will have implications for Indonesian involvement in multilateral and bilateral agreements. Regardless of the financial incentives or political pressure from outside, if a particular reform is not politically popular domestically, it is unlikely to succeed. 51. Governance for effective monitoring, reporting and verification: refers to governance issues related to needed monitoring report and verification of carbon emission reduction of REDD schemes 52. Governance of carbon markets: refers to governance issues related to fraudulent activities and lack of transparency and law enforcement in carbon markets 53. Governance of international funds for REDD: refers to governance of funds provided by the international community at the national and subnational level related to lack of transparency and law enforcement in administration of these funds 54. Corruption: refers to corrupt and collusive practices (involving illegal activities involving government officials) and related law enforcement issues 55. Other law enforcement: involving the implementation and enforcement of criminal law other than indicated in the above categories
